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ABSTRACT 
 
Gender has become an important area of increased focus in discourses on human rights and 
development over the last thirty years, but unfortunately that focus has primarily been on liberal 
approaches to gender as mediated through international organizations. The history of Tanzania 
offers an opportunity for more expansive scholarly interrogations of gender within political 
action in Africa. In particular, the evolution of women’s movements in Tanzania from the early 
independence era to post-structural adjustment is instructive for understanding the potential of 
non-elite women’s subaltern mass movements and the limitations of liberal institutionalism. This 
article examines that evolution, tracing these movements after first identifying theoretical entry 
points that allow for a better understanding of the work of Tanzanian non-elite women. 
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Introduction 
The increasing prevalence of feminist gendered discourses within international governance 
bodies is one of the most important developments of the past thirty years. Unfortunately, the 
increasing utilization of gendered analysis has been siloed. Discreet aspects of policy around 
political liberation and economic development have been reformed in the name of gender equity, 
but larger areas of sustained gender-conscious justice have yet to be integrated into global 
economic and political systems. Indeed, gendered reforms are often explicitly liberal and 
singular, like gender quotas for state parliaments, or ill defined, like the vague but popular goal 
of women’s “empowerment.” These efforts are not without impact, but they are rarely intended 
to fundamentally alter larger social realities. As a result, non-elite women continue to be 
disproportionately politically marginalized, despite policy modifications supposedly intended to 
create equality. In African contexts, this global reality has been exacerbated by a history of 
colonial looting predicated on creating poverty and ignoring grassroots desires that extends into 
the present day. 
Ensuring that the needs of African non-elite women are met through future policy reform 
requires more than a reworking of Western discourses and institutions. A truly egalitarian project 
of gendered reform requires drawing on the work of non-elite women in specific and historicized 
African contexts. The case of Tanzanian non-elite women in the second half of the twentieth 
century is particularly generative, given the centrality of both women and egalitarianism in 
Tanzanian politics and the post-independence state. Comparing the political contributions of 
Tanzanian non-elite women during the anti-colonial independence movement to women’s 
movements working in the ongoing aftermath of structural adjustment demonstrates both the 
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potential of feminist discourses that explicitly consider class as a gendered concern within 
development and the limitations of gender advocacy movements that fail to fundamentally alter 
systems of poverty. This article attempts to serve as an entry point to that comparison by 
identifying theoretical frames for best understanding the work of Tanzanian non-elite women, 
evaluating the structure and impacts of movements in both eras, and suggesting a path forward 
for similar scholarly work. 
 
Prioritizing the Knowledge of Tanzanian Women 
Before examining the local and global implications of Tanzania’s history, it is useful to first 
acknowledge the theoretical constraints of this article. While this research primarily looks at the 
work of non-elite women, it is not possible to ascribe a singular experience to non-elite women 
at any point in Tanzania’s history. So, the most effective pathway to understanding their 
movements is to recognize the concerns and actions they mobilized around. This methodology 
precludes mapping the experience of European or Western women’s movements onto the 
experiences of Tanzanian women, as the experiences of non-elite women in Tanzania are not 
necessarily analogous to those of women in other contexts. Scholarship on their work should not 
default to presuming a singular experience of womanhood. Although some aspects of patriarchy 
in Tanzania require external critique, it is important not to assume that patriarchy is universal or 
that prominent external representatives of powerful feminisms have greater relevance in feminist 
debates than local actors. As a foundational work on the colonizing impacts of academic 
feminism, Chandra Mohanty’s seminal article “Under Western Eyes: Feminist Scholarship and 
Colonial Discourses” is particularly useful for framing this conversation. As Mohanty (1988) 
suggests, essentializing analysis only reinforces neocolonial norms of knowledge production and 
undermines the goal of allowing for autonomy among non-elite African women. In fact, at varied 
moments in the historical arc of women’s movements in Tanzania, the efforts of non-elite 
women have run directly counter to dominant Western feminisms that emerged in response to 
European and American forms of patriarchy. 
In order to avoid the prioritization of hegemonic external opinions, it is powerful to 
acknowledge the women involved with specific movements as the primary experts on the value 
of those movements, embracing them as organic intellectuals, following Gramsci (Zompetti 
1997). Gramsci’s model notes that cultural and political knowledge are created and embodied 
across class, race, and gender hierarchies, and that those individuals closest to the embodiment of 
any group’s particular reality have a unique understanding of that reality, and, by extension, a 
knowledge of movements that can change their lived experiences (Zompetti 1997). This 
approach is valuable in the case of Tanzanian women’s movements for a number of reasons, not 
least of which is because it is instructive on how to handle global contestations of the label of 
woman. It might be valuable to question the particular value of womanhood as an identity given 
its connection to essentialized binaries of sex. However, such an interrogation should not take 
priority in the case of Tanzania given the wide popularity of womanhood as an identity with 
significant meaning shared by women in both internal and external liberation struggles. 
Similarly, while the power of singular feminized motifs like motherhood has been critically 
interpreted by scholars such as Carole Pateman (2005), the limitations and efficacy of such 
motifs receive little attention here given their productive use in examining Tanzania. 
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The Possibility of Letting the Experiences of Non-Elite Women Speak 
An intention to think and write through a decolonized lens does not inherently lead to effective 
execution of decolonial scholarship. The legacy of Western movements like Marxism or the 
Enlightenment cannot be simply waved away as if ignoring them dispels their relevance or 
prevalence. As a result, the arguments that follow are still framed within an academic set of 
norms that prioritizes the voices of specifically credentialed individuals who are given the bulk 
of unevenly divided resources. Given this structural limitation, it is important not to build 
scholarship on Tanzanian women’s movements in a way that further limits the capacity for the 
experiences of non-elite women to be heard. In the face of dominant discourses, the non-elite 
women of Tanzania are particularly susceptible to erasure. At the intersection of African, black 
and brown, women, and poor identities, the communities that comprise Tanzania’s non-elite 
classes are antithetical to the hegemonic value systems that organize global economic and social 
value. By the very nature of their exclusion, they represent the global apotheosis of another 
Gramiscian idea that Gayatri Spivak (2010), among others, has widely expanded – the subaltern. 
Defined simply, the subaltern are those members of society who are marginalized and silenced 
by hegemonic values. 
As Spivak (2010) argues, it is nearly impossible to represent subaltern voices or interests 
since dominant existing methods of knowledge creation and representation are rooted in 
disregarding their needs and desires. This manifests as a scarcity of scholarship around 
Tanzanian women generally, and in an even greater absence of opinion polls, social histories, 
and political treatises geared toward understanding Tanzanian women peasants. Such absences 
make it difficult to examine the meaning of Tanzanian women’s actions, let alone interrogate the 
complicated nuances of race, kinship, and religion that further complicate their intent. Tanzania 
has consistently ranked as one of the twenty-five poorest nations in the world, so even 
comparatively middle-class women have lacked the ties to financial and political power that 
might classify them as elite in a comparative sense (Mtonga 1993). This means that, at least 
within the context of current study, the elite woman status in Tanzania is largely confined to 
those with unique access to wealth and education, whose contact with success and/or power has 
primarily stemmed from connections to patriarchal systems of control. As such, existing 
scholarship primarily excludes wealthy individuals who have operated outside grassroots 
movements. One such woman is Saira Dewji, whose complicity in extractive economies has 
done little to add to gendered attempts at political change (Pederson and Kwek 2017). Similarly, 
less attention is paid to liberal discourses that have already been deeply interrogated, like 
legislative gender quotas, which have helped to elevate well-connected women into the halls of 
power, but have done little to reshape the actual nature of those same halls. Naming these 
scholarly restrictions amplifies those activists and methods most closely aligned with or tied to 
the actual development of non-elite Tanzanian women. Attempting to demonstrate the lessons of 
Tanzanian subaltern women for the larger context of gendered liberation policies in Africa would 
not be effective, or perhaps even possible, without understanding that the most important women 
involved come from the subaltern. 
 
Independence-Era Tanzania as an Exceptional Case for Women 
With those intellectual preconditions established, it is possible to examine the successes of non-
elite women in building political power during the early political creation of an independent 
Tanzania. Starting in the mid-1950s and continuing through the early 1960s, non-elite women 
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helped create an early vision of Tanzania (then Tanganyika) as a radically egalitarian state, and 
coordinated networks of political and social collaboration for subaltern women that shaped the 
future of Tanzanian policy. With that early push, and perhaps more than in any other early post-
colonial African state, poor and marginalized women directed the actual priorities of the 
independence movement, and the newly-created state rewarded them with universalized public 
goods like education and healthcare. Support for gender justice, or at least a greater degree of 
gender equity, was advanced through the power of a new politics of liberation and shared 
networks of organic political participation. 
In some scholarship, this gendered success is attributed to the radical and inclusive vision of 
Julius Nyerere, the most prominent pro-independence leader in colonial Tanganyika and the 
independent nation’s first president (Ladner 1971). He espoused Ujamaa – an influential political 
theory of specifically African socialism that roughly translates from Swahili to “familyhood” and 
includes a comparatively enlightened understanding of women as equally valuable to men, if in 
compatible roles rather than integrated ones. This helped set the tone for the inclusion of poor 
and socially marginalized women in Tanzanian politics (Lal 2010). However, this was not a 
spontaneously offered gift of power and enfranchisement given to powerless masses out of pity. 
Nyerere’s personal politics certainly made him receptive to poor women’s inclusion in the 
advocacy and actions of the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU), but it was the pre-
existing acuity and determination of subaltern women that made it necessary for him to act on his 
most inclusive impulses. 
As Susan Geiger has documented, in these early days, Nyerere was himself taught by a 
variety of women about the importance of gender equity, African specificity, and emancipatory 
politics (Geiger 1996). Their input carried weight both because of the limitations of Nyerere’s 
own personal context, and because of the power that the sheer number of Tanzanian women 
carried as a collective. While Nyerere, possessing a Scottish graduate degree, was the most 
educated person in Tanzania and the lineal son of the chief of his local kinship network, it was 
not solely his social standing that granted him primacy among early Tanzanian leaders (Bjerk 
2017, 41). The popularity of his well-articulated belief in a post-colonial system that would 
distribute prosperity more fairly, but avoid solely relying on the external ideology of Leninism, 
probably played a larger role in his pre-independence ascendance and certainly in his post-
independence popularity. This politics of socialism might seem to avoid the explicit question of 
gender, but it was actually especially dependent on the thoughts and needs of poor women. 
Material needs require poor Tanzanian women to labor, and, in Nyerere’s conceptualization of 
Ujamaa, society would reflect the industrious norms of poor women rather than the apathy of 
elite women (Nyerere 1968). 
Further, Nyerere’s experience of comparative privilege isolated him from some of the 
impacts of gendered coloniality, but the extensive contributions of women helped ensure that his 
emancipatory politics did not fall into the rigidly exclusionary sexism of other African leaders 
like Leopold Senghor (Eko 1986). It was also after conversations with women who were 
politically marginalized by chiefs when they attempted to attend TANU meetings and women 
who led recruitment tours that Nyerere actually began to shape more aggressive recruitment 
plans for TANU (Geiger 1982). In his words, “women who live in the villages work harder than 
anybody else in Tanzania” (Nyerere 1968). The claim of one prominent woman leader that it was 
she who had to teach Nyerere Swahili as an adult was likely a vast overstatement, but it speaks to 
the larger role that Tanzanian women played on an interpersonal level, using their experiences to 
shape responsive leaders (Geiger 1996). Women without traditional social power thus fostered 
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the roots of Tanzania’s earliest national political reality. They were not simply relegated to 
advisory positions though. Non-elite women were also able to assume positions of leadership and 
power, contradictory though this might seem in light of their status as subaltern. 
 
The Roles of Non-Elite Women 
Bibi Titi Mohammed is undoubtedly the most famous of the non-elite women political leaders, 
and, after an unfortunate period of scholarly neglect, her impact on the success of independence 
is now often cited. Her independent contributions are worth noting, but she also more broadly 
represents a certain kind of non-elite woman leader in Tanzania who effectively shaped greater 
gender equity through grassroots organizing. In 1955, Titi Mohammed was a working member of 
a dance and music group in Dar es Salaam (Geiger 1982). She was sporadically involved with 
the early movement. However, when a colonial administrator came to Tanzania and asked to 
meet with the head of TANU’s women’s auxiliary, an organization that did not exist, Titi 
Mohammed filled the imaginary role (Geiger 1987). This quickly escalated into her founding and 
leading an early version of a TANU women’s organization, recruiting 5,000 members in under 3 
months. Under Bibi Titi Mohammed’s leadership, the group was not a passive women’s 
auxiliary, like earlier local elite social clubs that discussed knitting and small-scale charity work 
(Geiger 1987). To the contrary, it was in some ways the foremost engine of independence. 
Unlike in Kenya, the Tanzanian push for independence involved little violent conflict, so the 
hierarchical and masculine trappings of militarization were not a barrier to entry for women 
(Geiger 1987). Even more importantly, because of gendered assumptions around roles, women 
of the colonial era were better positioned than men to organize support for independence through 
events like concerts, rallies, and meetings. 
Using preexisting social spaces like dance halls and family homes, Bibi Titi Mohammed 
helped create a network of women leaders who spread TANU’s vision of egalitarian 
independence across the country (Geiger 1987). These women were not rich socialites, but rather 
working-class fish mongers, fruit merchants, and beer brewers. Bibi Titi Mohammed herself was 
Muslim – part of a religious community purposefully disenfranchised by colonial administrators 
– as well as illiterate (Geiger 1996). At the same time that she coordinated the birth of Tanzania 
through her barnstorming cross-country advocacy, she still worked as a music leader. Her 
working spirit fueled the movement and demonstrated the dedication of working women to the 
cause of independence. She represented the localized woman leaders, who ranged in age from 17 
to their 80s, across the country (Geiger 1996). These women were active in the movement 
because they believed independence would bring greater justice, and because there seemed to be 
no other way to demand the education, enfranchisement, and political autonomy that most of 
them craved. 
 
The Roles of Elite Women 
The prevalence of working-class women leaders did not completely preclude elite women from 
holding positions of power, but it did shape how those elite women approached their 
accountability to womanhood as a political identity and the roles available to them. In many 
young independent African nations, local elites parlayed the vacuum left by colonial powers into 
personal riches. Elite women, particularly the collaborating African quasi-gentry, benefited 
enormously from this exploitation of power, and, as such, even when they supported policies that 
challenged gender inequities, they were often limited in their advocacy as they prioritized class 
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exploitation over gendered liberation. This resulted in meaningful, but very limited, gains like 
finishing schools for young girls. In postcolonial Tanzania, this was far less frequently the case, 
and elite women leaders were usually the most committed allies of working-class women. 
Two women emblematic of this allyship were Lucy Lameck, an Oxford-educated daughter of 
a politically influential Christian family, and Lady Marion Chesham, a white American-British 
expat whose husband had been a wealthy landowner (Geiger 1997, 129–32 and 198–201). 
Alongside Titi Mohammed, both Lameck and Chesham served in the first post-independence 
session of the Tanzanian legislative assembly in 1962, and tirelessly advocated for poor women 
as members of parliament through to 1975 and 1972, respectively. Both women used their 
legislative roles to support Titi Mohammed as a voice for working women in matters as serious 
as the provision of equal parental status for women, and as mundane as rebuking a male member 
of parliament who insinuated that poor young women were destroying the social welfare of 
Tanzania with their covertly sexual dancing (Geiger 1997, 129–32 and 198–201). Lucy Lameck 
supplemented this commitment in her cabinet role as Parliamentary Secretary of Cooperatives 
and Community Development, where she helped ensure that Tanzania’s development policies 
benefited the rural poor. In total, she led programs that expanded new craft and agricultural skills 
to over 100,000 women (Jellicoe 1962). 
Similarly, outside of her legislative duties, Lady Chesham helped found the Community 
Development Trust Fund (CDTF), which funneled external aid to internal development projects 
in Tanzania (Black 1992, 146). During Chesham’s tenure, the CDTF encouraged projects 
targeted at eliminating burdens for poor women, based on the idea that women would be the 
driving force behind community development if they were given knowledge, time, and 
opportunity – a premise that was a radical approach to development aid at the time. After she 
stepped down, Chesham passed leadership of the agency to a working-class Tanzanian woman 
named Martha Bulengo (Black 1992, 146–48). This type of early leadership of poor women 
encouraged their elite counterparts to prioritize the needs of poor women in gender equity 
advocacy, and also stymied the class divisions that limited the efficacy of female political figures 
elsewhere. This contributed to stronger political coalitions around the identity of womanhood, 
and helped expand access to social services like education, health care, and agricultural training, 
which was limited by class or gender in comparable contexts. 
 
The Impact of these Early Women’s Movements 
The wide scope of the contributions of poor Tanzanian women resulted in both the kind of 
prescriptive representation now widely celebrated in liberalized contexts, and more broadly 
beneficial reforms like the expansion of more equal educational opportunities that erased racial 
segregation (Lewis et al. 1962, 34). By the time independence was actually achieved in 1961, 
Bibi Titi Mohammed was described as the second most popular and well-known politician in 
Tanzania (Geiger 1996). By 1955, women had constituted most of TANU’s registered 
membership and poor women made up the vast majority (Geiger 1996). Many of the women 
involved in the independence movement had joined in part because the party promised an 
expansion of education, and, eventually, an expansion of accessible health options – promises 
that were partially fulfilled. 
Women constituted an undeniable part of the body politic, and gendered advocacy was 
embedded in the fiber of the country’s egalitarian politics. In many other newly postcolonial 
contexts, singular women who helped build independence movements were often uninterested in 
broad reforms that benefited the majority of women. Thus, the above successes, while impressive 
Peeples Evolution of Tanzanian Women’s Movements 
 
 27 
on their own, are even more surprising given the external pressure to marginalize poor women. 
In the case of education, for example, the very first relevant UNESCO reports actually suggested 
reducing investment in women’s education, a request the Tanzanian state ignored (Lewis et al. 
1962, 54). This early context suggests some important lessons for modern gendered movements. 
Central to the success of Tanzanian women’s success were specific policy asks, a connection to 
the larger ideology of equality, explicit acknowledgement of gender, and open democratic 
organizing led by non-elites. In coordination, these made the contribution of the early women’s 
movement particularly effective. Nevertheless, there were obvious limitations. The upper 
echelons of leadership remained primarily in the hands of men and the political arena remained 
frustratingly androcentric. More broadly relevant to poor women, their concerns around land 
rights and protection from domestic violence were largely ignored for the time being. In a sense, 
these early successes were meant to hold a promise of continued reforms. Unfortunately, that 
promise later went partially unfulfilled. 
 
The Decline and Inflection Point of Early Women’s Movements in Tanzania 
If the political action of working-class Tanzanian women during the independence movement 
was rooted in optimism about the possibility of socialist class politics, then the growth of 
women’s movements after structural adjustment was at least partly imagined as a response to the 
failures of the utopian Ujamaa vision. After maintaining relative political stability for most of the 
1960s, the Tanzanian government started rapidly accelerating their commitment to radical 
socialism in 1967 (Nyerere 1968). The expanded implementation of Ujamaa continued 
throughout the 1970s. In many instances, Ujamaa drastically improved measurements of human 
welfare like literacy and gender parity in primary schools, but these benefits were somewhat 
offset by a villagization scheme that coercively relocated over 4 million people (Scott 1998, 
223). The expansion of the state greatly benefited social welfare projects, but also limited space 
for dissent. Non-elite women sat at the crux of these contradictions. Under Ujamaa, many of the 
aims of women’s movements around education, employment, and political equality were met 
(Scott 1998, 223). However, during the same period, the political power of the women’s 
organization was largely undermined, and most prominent women leaders were removed from 
official office for various reasons, including the charges of treason that would functionally exile 
Bibi Titi Mohammed from public life (Geiger 1996). 
The uncomfortable balance between increasing human welfare for women and decreasing 
political space for women’s voices was not the low point for Tanzanian women’s movements. 
The nadir emerged as the larger project of Ujamaa began to collapse. Starting in the late 1970s, a 
war with Uganda, growing national debt, and the global oil crisis pushed the Tanzanian economy 
into collapse. By 1985, Nyerere had resigned, and by 1986, the Tanzanian government had 
signed an agreement with the IMF that implemented neoliberal austerity across the board 
(Hodgson 2002). At this point, women’s potential for political power became more limited, due 
to the increased domination of international neoliberal reforms within Tanzanian politics; at the 
same time, those same policies undermined the human welfare programs that had benefited poor 
women in the past. The breakage created space for new kinds of movements. After the 
implementation of structural adjustment, women’s movements in Tanzania followed the global 
trend toward NGO-ification with mixed results. Non-elite women increasingly benefited from 
organizations that catered to needs the state had previously ignored, but were also generally 
harmed by the reduction of direct governmental accountability (Badri and Tripp 2017). 
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Successes and Failures of Post-Structural Adjustment Women’s Movements  
Several particularly notable organizations focused on women’s advocacy grew out of a 
blossoming moment for Tanzanian NGOs, including national groups Tanzania Gender 
Networking Programme (TGNP) and Tanzania Media Women’s Association (TAMWA) (Badri 
and Tripp 2017). In the growing space for dissent in the 1990s, both organizations saw an 
opportunity to combat remaining gendered inequalities and injustices that had gone ignored 
under the politics of Ujamaa. Leaders at TAMWA have since described their organization as 
having psychologically rejected dependency on state reform to embrace the gender-oriented 
development and social change that flourished under Ujamaa (Badri and Tripp 2017). Building 
from this approach of external activism and international events like the Fourth World 
Conference on Women in 1995 which resulted in the Beijing Declaration, both organizations 
have experienced meaningful success in advocating for political reforms that create legal 
protections for women’s equality, such as the Laws of Marriage Act and Village Land Act of 
1999, which codified that customary practice could not be utilized to deny women the ability to 
own land (Badri and Tripp 2017). TGNP, in particular, has boldly advocated for LGBTQ 
individuals, vastly expanding the gender purview of feminist organizing in Tanzania. Smaller 
NGOs have used similar approaches to advocate for the specific needs of disabled women and 
women from ethnic minorities like the Maasai (Hodgson 2002). Some scholars, like Ali Mari 
Tripp, have argued that this growth of gender-focused NGOs in Tanzania, and in Africa more 
broadly, represents an unprecedented opportunity for activists and organizers interested in 
advancing the social and civil rights for non-elite Tanzanian women (Tripp 2003). This approach 
understands the modern growth of NGOs that are interested in supporting women as a 
continuation of the work done by women during the independence movement. 
However, the success of these independent NGOs as replacements for a unified political 
movement of liberation grounded in gendered analysis should not be overestimated. As one 
example, the scholarly optimism of those such as Tripp (2003) ignores that the neoliberal 
political reality that enables the growth of NGOs is a rupture with the socialist politics that 
enabled past gendered advocacy. In the past, poor women in Tanzania were able to push for 
significant change because political organizing had few barriers to entry, which allowed them to 
reimagine their existing social connections as vectors for political engagement. In contrast, 
NGOs are funded through complex international financial structures that require technical skills 
like grant writing and bilingual or multilingual fluency, not to mention the more basic 
prerequisites like advanced literacy and numeracy. As a result, Tanzanian NGOs working on 
gender are unable to employ the poor women they advocate for and claim to represent. Working 
class women are effectively barred from participating in their own liberation. Tripp implicitly 
acknowledges this undemocratic reality when she lists modern faces of Tanzanian feminism and 
is only able to draw on elites like academics, consultants, and politicians (Badri and Tripp 2017). 
By the same token, Tripp describes poverty as the foremost issue facing Tanzanian women, but 
only a few of the legislative reforms she describes being passed are directly tied to combatting 
poverty in any substantial and structural way (Badri and Tripp 2017). 
These flaws in representation and legislation point to a larger failure. Fettered by their 
reliance on international donors, and unable to meaningfully appeal to any universal mandate, 
NGOs like TAMWA and TGNP lack the capacity to advocate for the kind of radical reforms that 
are most likely to change the systemic and continuing issue of poverty for women in Tanzania. 
The cost of structural adjustment has not only been political for poor women. By most human 
development metrics, women in Tanzania are worse off under the newly liberalized system than 
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they were under the socialism of the 1970s. In fact, structural adjustment programs generally 
tend to create significant inequality, which in turn exacerbates the marginalization of the poor 
(Babb 2005; Elson 1988; Gindling and Robbins 2001; Konadu-Agyemang 2000). In Tanzania, 
this has held true for everything from maternal health outcomes to education equity, leaving 
most metrics worse off than comparable measures from almost any point during Ujamaa 
(Lugalla 1995, 53). 
Unfortunately, the most recent developments in Tanzanian politics suggest that the strength 
of gender equity movements will continue to shrink. In recent years, the Tanzanian state has 
grown more authoritarian under President Magufuli, who was elected in 2015. Increasingly, 
individual consolidation of wealth has been encouraged and celebrated, corrupt resource 
extraction by foreign companies has become normalized at the highest levels of government, and 
dissent, even from journalists and intellectuals, is more dangerous than at most earlier moments 
in Tanzania’s history (Reuters 2017). This all leaves little room for new gendered political 
advocacy. TGNP, for example, has already experienced such significant backlash from its 
LGBTQ advocacy that it has had to reduce its public visibility. Without the widespread political 
support of peasant women, NGOs and activists will become even more susceptible to the 
coercive limitations of the state. In turn, the deteriorating social conditions of non-elite women 
will continue to unravel. President Magufuli’s recent decision to reverse existing policy norms 
and expel any school girls who become pregnant before graduating suggests that the legislative 
victories for women’s rights from the past few decades are at risk of vanishing as quickly as the 
social welfare successes of Ujamaa (Aglionby 2017). In this historical moment, Tanzania stands 
at the precipice of another possible radical shift in the structure of political organizing around the 
needs of non-elite women. 
 
Conclusion 
There is no inherent virtue in romanticizing Tanzania’s early post-colonial past. Bibi Titi 
Mohammed and Julius Nyerere are not mythical figures, and the political compromises of the 
early independence movement are not above criticism. It is not hard to see how the political 
marginalization of women under later Ujamaa represented a failure of the supposedly equality-
focused mandate of the country’s leaders. However, by the same token, it is also important not to 
undervalue the successes of the era. Since the early 2000s, it has become popular in development 
circles to celebrate Tanzania’s supposed recovery from economic collapse. While Tanzania’s 
economy has largely stabilized, it is important not to underestimate what was lost when the IMF 
used austerity to crush one of the most heterodox and revolutionary African governments of the 
twentieth century. Given the continuing futility of trying to solve gendered, racial, and 
geographic inequities as independent development problems, the work of subaltern women in 
shaping the Tanzanian state’s most effective politics and policies is a historical touchstone. The 
legalistic gender advocacy that has gained global dominance in the modern era is impressive, but 
in comparison to earlier Tanzanian liberation movements, it lacks a cohesive politics of systemic 
change. This is reflective of a broader failure among policy analysts to consider the factors of 
class and power in the implementation of feminist politics. 
In Tanzania, non-elite women’s early integration of gendered development norms into a 
larger politics of postcolonial freedom and egalitarian wealth distribution not only allowed them 
greater access to powerful movements of liberation, but also forced self-proclaimed ally 
communities, like elite women, to more radically address their needs in the long term. On a 
localized scale, this historical legacy of class and gender collaboration seems to be a uniquely 
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powerful tool for any attempt to resist authoritarian neoliberalism in Tanzania. On a global scale, 
policy makers and scholars need to use historical movements like those of pro-independence 
women in Tanzania to imagine and support new movements that center the needs of 
intersectionally marginalized groups, particularly at the nexus of class and gender. Committing 
to this class-conscious and gendered justice of solidarity is one part of reimagining the limited 
politics of liberal intervention that have failed to substantively undermine patriarchies across the 
world. 
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